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THE WISCONSIN WAY FORWARD WITH COMITY:
A LEGAL TERM FOR RESPECT

James Botsford and Paul Stenzel*
INTRODUCTION

Over the last twenty years, tribal and state courts in Wisconsin have enjoyed
remarkable progress in coordinating two overlapping yet distinct legal systems in order

to better serve their constituents. The story is a complicated and fascinating one
consisting of many elements that go well beyond the development of the law. It is
beyond the law where we try to go, at least in part, with this article. The cases and
statutes only tell part of the story. What about the state and tribal judges shooting baskets
in a driveway and discussing how to best allocate cases between them where their
jurisdiction overlaps? What is the history of the institutions that have grown up? What
about the leaders? What other extra legal elements contributed to state-tribal judicial
cooperation and comity, particularly against a backdrop of often-contentious state-tribal
conflict?
Another purpose of this article is to chronicle the recreation of the tribal justice
systems in Wisconsin in the modern era and show how a mutuality of respect and
comityl between the tribal and state judiciaries has evolved in ways that have enhanced
them both. The ongoing result is the improvement of government-to-government
* James Botsford graduated from the University of North Dakota School of Law in 1984 and has
practiced exclusively in the area of Indian law since that time. He has been the Director of the Indian Law
Office of Wisconsin Judicare since 1991. He also serves as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska since 1996. James holds an elected position on the Steering Committee of the
National Association of Indian Legal Services. He is licensed to practice in Wisconsin and numerous tribal
courts. James is a member of the State-Tribal Judicial Forum in Wisconsin and has assisted with tribal court
development initiatives for over 20 years.
Paul Stenzel graduated from the University of Wisconsin Law School in 1995. Upon receiving his J.D.,
he worked as a Staff Attorney for the Stockbridge-Munsee Community Indian Tribe from 1995 to 2003. In
September, 2003 Paul joined the firm of von Briesen & Roper, s.c., in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where he
continued to practice Indian law. In May, 2005, Paul opened Stenzel Law Office LLC. Paul's practice has
focused almost exclusively on federal Indian law since the inception of his legal career. His major areas of
interest are tribal court development, state-tribal judicial relations and jurisdictional issues relating to Public
Law 280.
The authors would like to thank David Patton for his able assistance in research for this article. David is
a law student at the U. of Minnesota School of Law (2013) and has a particular interest in Indian Law. His
skillful assistance was most helpful.
1. Hilton v Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 143 (1895) ("Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation . . . .").
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relationships and better access to justice for those using the courts.
This article is divided into five parts: first, an overview of Wisconsin's tribes,
where we briefly survey the legal landscape; second, a history of the 1990s when the
Wisconsin Tribal Judges Association was born and the seeds of comity took root; third,
the Bad River Band v. Teague case, the landmark decision that raised consciousness
about coordinating tribal and state court efforts; fourth, an examination of section 801.54
of the Wisconsin Statutes, which allows state trial courts to use discretion and transfer
cases to tribal court on the basis of comity; and fifth, conclusions and observations.
As we compiled, assessed, and digested all of our information, we noticed several
themes. We mention them now so you can watch for them and draw some of your own
conclusions along the way: first, Public Law 280 ("P.L. 280") forced the tribes and the
states to deal with each other in ways non-P.L. 280 states and tribes may not always
encounter; second, two key institutions that allowed the development of trust and
relationships are the Wisconsin Tribal Judges Association and the State-Tribal Justice
Forum; third, the necessity of that indefinable quality in people where, when confronted
with a choice between maintaining the status quo or taking a risk to improve things for
everyone, they choose the latter and then, graciously, the other side reciprocates (one
might call this faith); and fourth, the importance and expansion of comity between the
state and tribes. Comity is a flexible term that embodies many aspects of human relations
including trust, leadership, courage, honesty, perseverance and wisdom.
One final introductory thought: the importance of comity to this story cannot be
overstated. Even among lawyers, there is some confusion about the difference between
"full faith and credit" and "comity." This is understandable because the effect of both is
the same, that is the enforcement of, inter alia, the judgments and legislation of one
sovereign by another sovereign. The difference between the two arises not so much from
the effect, but from the how and the why. Full faith and credit is a constitutional principle
requiring states to enforce fully the judgments and orders of other states.2 Full faith and
credit may also be imposed by statute. 3 This idea is so core to American politics that it
actually predates the American Constitution. 4 However, American full faith and credit
applies to relations between the states and is not generally applicable in tribe-state
relations. 5
Comity is the principle of international law by which a sovereign gives deference
to the judgments of another due to mutual respect. Because comity is based on reciprocal
courtesy rather than a legal mandate, it must be negotiated and agreed to by the
sovereigns. In some cases, one sovereign will take unilateral action in enforcing the
judgments of the other. Most often, the two sovereigns will determine together under
what circumstances they will honor the will of the other. Because of the close
2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State."); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) (implementing the clause).
3. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 806.245 (2011).
4. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 3 ("Full faith and credit shall be given in each of
these States to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other State.").
5. Kelly Stoner & Richard A. Orona, Full Faith and Credit, Comity, or Federal Mandate? A Path That
Leads to Recognition and Enforcement of Tribal Court Orders, Tribal Protection Orders, and Tribal Child
Custody Orders,34 N.M. L. REV. 381, 386 (2004) (noting that the majority of states do not afford full faith and
credit to tribal court orders).
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relationships between the state and tribal judiciaries in Wisconsin, the principles of
comity as applied here provide a national model for how states and tribes can work
together for the betterment of both.
PART I -OVERVIEW

OF WISCONSIN'S TRIBES

The eleven federally recognized tribes in Wisconsin are a mixture of different
peoples, some closely related, some not. Some tribes' stories say they come from around
Wisconsin; others got here through the cultural chaos of contact with the Europeans. All
of them share stories of disruption and devastation from those times.
With our larger purpose in mind of exploring the arc of tribal-state relations, we
shall skip over earlier judicial histories that have been described elsewhere 6 and pick up
the story in 1953 with the passage of P.L. 280. Wisconsin was one of five states in
which this experiment was initially imposed (as an unfunded mandate).9 Ten tribes in
Wisconsin were all made subject to P.L. 280, a law that is still in effect today and that
shapes the tribal-state judicial relations in Wisconsin. The eleventh tribe, the
Menominee, was initially exempt from P.L. 280,10 but within two years they were
officially terminated ending their federal recognition as a tribe. Fortunately, the
Menominee's federal recognition was eventually restored, and they retained their
exemption from P.L. 280."
Federal attitudes toward Indians have gone through numerous formal policy
phases, most of them brutal and embarrassing in hindsight.12 The stated federal Indian
policy in effect in 1953 was known unabashedly as "the Termination Era.',13 During this
period (1953 - 1961), the United States government's stated intention was to get out of

6. E.g, Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions: Deviations from
ConstitutionalPrinciplesand the CraftingofJudicialSmallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405 (2003).
7. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a)
(2006) & 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2006)) (allocating federal Indian country law enforcement responsibility over
the tribes in six states - Minnesota, Alaska, California, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and Oregon (known as the
"mandatory states") to the state governments); see also Vanessa J. Jimenez & Soo C. Song, Concurrent Tribal
and State Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280, 47 AM. U. L. REv. 1627, 1634 (1998) (attributing the enormous
impact of P.L. 280 to the fact that the six "mandatory states" contained "359 of the over 550 federally
recognized tribes and Native Villages").
8. Alaska was added as the sixth mandatory state in 1958 in connection with its admission to the union.
Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2006) &
28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2006)).
9. See Jimenez & Song, supra note 7, at 1657 ("These states received no federal subsidies to ease the
financial burden of their new responsibilities, were precluded from taxing reservation lands to raise their own
revenues, and received jurisdiction without tribal consent.").
10. See Stephen J. Herzberg, The Menominee Indians: Termination to Restoration, 6 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
143, 161 (1978) (arguing that although Congress cited the highly acclaimed Menominee law and order system
and the tribe's desire for autonomy, the Menominee were primarily exempt from P.L. 280 because Congress
was aware of the tribes impending termination).
11. 25 U.S.C. §§ 903-903a (2006).
12.

See generally STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES: THE AUTHORITATIVE ACLU

GUIDE TO INDIAN AND TRIBAL RIGHTS 1-17 (Eve Cary ed., S. Ill. Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2002) (1983) (describing

Tribal Independence (1492-1787), Agreements Between Equals (1787-1828), Relocation of the Indians (18281887), Allotment and Assimilation (1887-1934), Indian Reorganization (1934-1953), Termination (19531968), and The Present: Tribal Self-Determination (1968-Present)).
13.

COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

§

1.06 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis

2005 ed. 2005) (1940).
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the Indian business.14 P.L. 280 essentially said to the state of Wisconsin and the other
ten tribes, "[w]e hereby give to the state our jurisdictional authority toward Indians on
those ten reservations." Much has been written about P.L. 280,15 but in a nut-shell it
meant that the state courts and state law enforcement now had jurisdiction over crimes
committed by Indians on the reservations, as well as civil jurisdiction in adjudicatory
(non-regulatory) civil cases. The previous federal Indian policies were all dismal failures
(as this one was doomed to be), and the U.S. simply wanted to end its complicated
relationship with tribes.
The biggest complications were perhaps the treaties - formal, solemn promises of
the United States. In the words of U.S. Senator Daniel Inuoye:
As a member of the United States Senate, it does not please me at all to
know that of the 800 treaties that were signed by Indian nations and the
president of the United States, the Senate of the United States refused
to act upon 430 of them. They just filed it away (although we insisted
that the Indians live up to their agreements). And we ratified 370 of the
treaties, but sadly, I must tell you that of the 370 treaties that the United
States Senate ratified, the United States government violated provisions
in every one of them. 16
During the Termination Era, the Menominee Nation suffered uniquely in
Wisconsin. It was the only tribe in the state that the U.S. literally terminated its
relationship with by declaring that, as far as the U.S. was concerned, the Menominees
were no longer a federally recognized tribal government, but were instead to be
restructured essentially as a corporation. 17 This story has been well told elsewhere. 18 For
our purposes, the important thing to note is that just as the mythical phoenix rises from
the ashes, so too did the Menominee Nation, regaining its federal recognition.19 Because
they were initially exempt from P.L. 280, in 1972, the Menominees were restored to a
government-to-government relationship with the U.S. without the then anachronistic
onus of P.L. 280.
By the 1960s, the Termination policy had been discredited as a cruel and abysmal
failure, and President Richard Nixon declared the new federal Indian policy to be one of
"self-determination."20 Every president since Nixon has reaffirmed the self14. Some mark the beginning of the Termination Era at 1953 when Congress formally stated its policy goal
as the following: "as rapidly as possible, to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States
subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other
citizens of the United States, to end their status as wards of the United States, and to grant them all of the rights
and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship" and terminated several tribes including the Menominee in
Wisconsin. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 67 Stat. B122 (1953); see, e.g, PEVAR, supra note 12, at 11.
15. See, e.g., CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND PUBLIC

LAw 280 (1997); see also, e.g, Jimenez & Song, supranote 7.
16. THE PEYOTE ROAD: ANCIENT RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY CRISIS (Kifaru Productions, Inc. 1993).
17. Menominee Indian Termination Act of Jun. 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250 (codified as amended at 25

U.S.C. §§ 891-902) (2006), repealedby Menominee Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 93-197, 87 Stat. 770 (1973)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 903-903f (2006).
18. See, e.g, Herzberg, supra note 10, at 170 n.127.
19. Menominee Restoration Act of Dec. 22, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-197, 87 Star. 770 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 903-903f (2006)) (restoring the Menominee Tribe).
20. See Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 212 PUB. PAPERS 564 (July 8, 1970) (stating
that the termination policies were a failure and adopting a policy of self-determination); see also Douglas B.L.
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determination policy. However, not all the damage of the Termination Era was undone.
Although the Menominees were restored, the other ten tribes remain subject to P.L. 280.
Prior to 1953, the federal govermnent and tribes had shared or "concurrent"
jurisdictional authority in Indian country.21 It is a fundamental principle of common
sense that you can only give away that which is yours. So when the federal government
granted its jurisdictional powers over Indians to the state in 1953, it did not alter the
inherent and ongoing jurisdictional power of the tribes. 22
Although the tribes maintained concurrent jurisdiction with the states under P.L.
280, as a practical matter the effect of transferring federal jurisdiction (responsibility) to
the state was huge; The U.S. stopped providing funds for law enforcement and judicial
services on those P.L. 280 reservations. Although the federal contributions to tribes had
been meager, if they occurred at all, the tribes themselves in those days did not have the
resources (or in some cases the government structure) to sustain police and courts.
Though they had latent jurisdiction, the states (and their counties) became, in effect, the
only game in town.
In fact, during those hard decades of the mid-twentieth century, there were many
people - Indian and non-Indian - who grew up thinking only the state had police and
court power on the reservations.
But with the Indian civil rights movement and all the awakenings that came with it,
Native people began to dust off those old treaties and laws and re-examine tribal
authority. And that is what, in significant measure, led to the modern tribal courts of
today. There were then and remain today great obstacles. For example, the Indian
Reorganization Act ("IRA") Constitutions were imposed on the tribes in the 1930s and
many remain substantially in place today. 23 They are a modeled but muddled version of
the U.S. government structures and an awkward fit in tribal communities. Furthermore,
neither the federal government nor the states want to fund the tribal courts in P.L. 280
states, even today as those courts continue to grow and take on increasing importance in
Indian Country.
Nevertheless, the tribal courts in P.L. 280 states have grown and evolved
exponentially in recent decades. They have grown to understand what concurrent
jurisdiction means and educated the state judiciary as to what concurrent jurisdiction
means. Thankfully, there have been some enlightened and supportive state court judges
who have been creative and cooperative in helping these underfunded tribal courts get
established and grow.
Ironically, the contentious and sometimes violent challenges to tribal rights in the
1970s and 1980s contributed to the growth of tribal courts in this region of the country.
Endreson, The Challenges Facing Tribal Courts Today, 79 JUDICATURE 142, 142 (1995) (describing the SelfDetermination policy introduced by President Nixon saying "the federal government's objectives were the
same as the tribes'enhancing [sic] tribal self-government and working toward economic self-sufficiency").
21. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 15, at 243.
22. See, e.g., TTEA v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo, 181 F.3d 676, 685 (5th Cir. 1999); Native Vill. of Venetie
I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 562 (9th Cir. 1991); Criminal Jurisdiction on the Seminole
Reservations in Florida, 85 Interior Dec. 433 (D.O. 1978); Jimenez & Song, supra note 7, at 1635.
23. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 476-77 (2006); see also PEVAR, supra note 12, at 8991 (describing how the Secretary of the Interior provided a model constitution for the tribes to adopt under the
IRA).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2011

5

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 47 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 7
TULSA LAW REVIEW

664

Vol. 47:3

As the Ojibway tribes in the Great Lakes region began exercising their treaty-based offreservation hunting, fishing, and gathering rights (especially spearfishing), it became
apparent to those tribes that they were going to have to exercise more judicial authority
in enforcing those rights and responsibilities.24 Successful litigation against the state was
destined to result in expanded tribal court activity in the area of conservation and natural
resources cases - including the jurisdictional complexities those cases often involved.
It was the implementation of the decision in Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt that brought this into sharp focus. 2 5 Tribes wanted
not only to exercise their treaty rights, they wanted to police them too.
In that context, several tribes in Wisconsin and Michigan came together to form
the short-lived Great Lakes Tribal Judges Association ("GLTJA") in the mid 1980s.
When the Wisconsin Tribal Judges Association ("WTJA") was formed in 1991, GLTJA
went into a dormancy from which it has not since emerged.
PART 2 -

COOPERATION ERA, THE 1990S

The Cooperation Era in Wisconsin began in 1991 when the trial court judges from
seven of the eleven federally recognized tribes in Wisconsin joined together and, with
the help of Wisconsin Judicare, created the WTJA. In the following years, the other four
tribes created or expanded their judiciaries, and now all eleven tribal judiciaries in
Wisconsin participate as members in the WTJA. First, it was focused on intertribal
judicial cooperation, and later, it expanded into cooperation with the state.
Some specific circumstances regarding the needs of and resources available to the
tribal courts led to the creation of the WTJA. The first key factor was the growth of each
of the tribal courts within their own jurisdictions. Throughout the last quarter of the
twentieth century, tribes in Wisconsin and elsewhere began exercising an increasing
amount of their inherent jurisdictional powers, which included the expansion of services
and responsibilities of the tribal courts. As the tribal courts grew and their caseloads
expanded, it became painfully clear that the availability of legal representation for
individuals in those courts was not keeping pace with the need. This necessity would
later mother the birth of the WTJA.
Another factor involved both the strengths and the limitations of Wisconsin
Judicare. Wisconsin Judicare provides legal aid to Wisconsin's northern thirty-three
counties and eleven federally recognized Indian tribes. Although Judicare has an Indian
Law Office ("ILO") devoted exclusively to working with tribes and their members, the
ILO is modestly funded and has never had the capacity to provide legal representation
for a significant percentage of cases in the tribal courts in Wisconsin. Among the ILO's
strengths is the ability to be responsive to the requests of tribal courts in creatively
designing initiatives that improve access to justice in Indian Country. ILO's weaknesses
24. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); Lac Courte Oreilles
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 760 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1985); Lac Courte Oreilles
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983); Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d
1323 (7th Cir. 1983).
25. Voigt, 700 F.2d at 363, 365 (holding that each treaty included "cession of land and a reservation of
usufructuary rights on the ceded land by those Indians relinquishing their territory" and unless the tribes
specifically gave up a right in the treaty, the tribe retained that right).
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include the lack of adequate funding and a geographic limitation mandated by funding
sources that require that services be provided to clients only in Wisconsin.
These factors and circumstances became significant in the creation of the WTJA in
1991. The tribal judges met that year with the ILO to explore ways to increase
representation for individuals on a daily basis in the tribal courts. From those discussions
emerged a federal grant application to the Administration for Native Americans
("ANA") to fund the training of lay advocates in the basic skills of legal representation.
The lay advocates would be individuals from the various tribes who received substantial
training involving tribal law, legal writing, and courtroom skills.
The ANA was very interested in funding this proposal. However, there was a key
sticking point: the recipient of the grant had to be an Indian organization, and the area
served had to be limited to a single state, in this case Wisconsin. The tribal judges and
the Judicare attorneys then asked the ANA if the "Wisconsin Tribal Judges Association"
would be an appropriate grant recipient. When the ANA indicated that would indeed be
just the kind of recipient they would fund, the judges and Judicare got together and
created the WTJA - and the ANA then funded the lay advocate project!
Birthed from the clever idea of creating the association as a way of establishing
eligibility for an outside grant in order to provide access to justice in their courts, the
Wisconsin Tribal Judges Association has gone on to be a hundred things. It is a forum
through which the tribal judiciaries provide in-house training to its members. It is a
source for finding pro-tem trial judges and appellate panels. It is a unified voice in
representing tribal court interests to the state judiciary and legislature as well as the
federal legislature. It is a sponsor and host for convening continuing judicial education
seminars for state and tribal judges. In addition, it is many other things as well,
including, very significantly, a model looked to by other state and tribal judiciaries in
other parts of the country. 26
The WTJA is a membership organization consisting of the judges from all eleven
federally recognized tribes in Wisconsin. It is governed by Articles of Incorporation and
by-laws. Although each court has one vote under the by-laws, as a practical matter nearly
all decision making is done by consensus. The WTJA meets four times per year on a
rotating basis for a two-day meeting. One day is devoted to a topic of in-house judicial
training and one day for a business meeting and (weather and agenda permitting) perhaps
a round of golf.2 7
The bringing together of tribal and state court judges for the purposes of judicial
education and getting acquainted began by serendipity. In 1996, by coincidence, both the
Stockbridge-Munsee Tribe and the Forest County Potawatomi Tribe were prepared to
open their modern tribal courts for the first time. Each of them, unbeknownst to the
other, called Judicare's Indian Law Office with essentially the same request: we are
about to open our court, and we would very much like to get off on a good footing with
the local state courts. We want to meet with the local state court judges, have a

26. On July 28-29, 2011, the WTJA and the Oneida Tribe of Wisconsin hosted state and tribal judges from
Michigan in a conference designed to showcase Wisconsin's state-tribal judicial development.
27. It seems ironic that European descendants and indigenous descendants would socially bond over a game
born in Scotland.
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discussion about what we intend to do, and hopefully, design a mutually beneficial
judicial relationship where we do not compete or step on each other's jurisdictional toes,
and thereby avoid some of the difficult relationships seen in other locales.
Judicare brought the two new tribal courts together. It was quickly determined that,
since they both shared the same idea and were both in the same part of the state, it made
sense to do something together. From that came the plan of a day-long seminar
sponsored by both courts, with state court judges from seven surrounding counties
invited. Through the Office of State Courts, Judicare arranged for the state court judges
to receive continuing judicial education credits and, significantly, that Office asked for
evaluations from the attendees at the end of the day.
Judicare coordinated the materials and the elements of training, including bringing
in as a featured presenter attorney Craig Dorsay from Oregon who was nationally
recognized as an expert in Indian law and had argued an Indian law case before the U.S.
Supreme Court. The training was a success: the food was good, and perhaps most
importantly, the evaluations were remarkable. There had been considerable trepidation
(perhaps on all sides) going into this, but the state court judges wrote on their evaluations
things such as the following: "This was very helpful and well-presented, we need more
of this" and "I had no idea that Indian law was so complex and tribal courts were so
important." From that particular day and those particular comments grew an on-going
series of formal and informal state and tribal judicial seminars that have put many of the
judges on a first name basis.
PART 3 -

TEAGUE

. BAD RIVER BAND: BAD FACTS MADE GOOD LAW.

State and tribal judges were not the only ones wrestling with overlapping
jurisdiction and trying to figure out how it all fits together. The users of the courts were
as well. There were a lot of good feelings and pats on the backs as state and tribal judges
slowly gained trust and learned about each other's systems. The gate crashers were the
litigants who often have no interest in cordial relations, but in winning. Those two
worlds collided in Teague v. Bad River Band.2 8
Civil transfers29 between state and tribal courts have been around for decades, 30
but landed in earnest in Wisconsin with the dispute between Jerry Teague, a non-Indian,
and the Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians. That case started in 1995
and resulted in two Wisconsin Supreme Court opinions. 3 1
In 1995, Mr. Teague, a non-Indian, separated from employment as casino manager
of the Bad River Tribe's casino.32 He brought suit in Ashland County Circuit Court

28. Teague v. Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 612 N.W.2d 709 (Wis.
2000).
29. See, e.g., Eagle-killing Case Ends in Tribal Court Guilty Plea, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Dec. 22, 2009,
billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/wyoming/article_0a2e40a6-ef7f-11 de-b075-001cc4c002e0.html
(transfer of a case from federal to tribal court).
30. See, e.g., Kennerly v. Dist. Court of Ninth Judicial Dist. of Mont., 400 U.S. 423, 428-29 (1971)
(holding that a state can take jurisdiction over civil matters arising in Indian country with tribal consent).
31. Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 665 N.W.2d 899 (Wis. 2003);
Teague, 612 N.W.2d 709.
32. Teague, 612 N.W. 2d at 711.
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seeking to enforce the arbitration clause of his employment contract. 33 The Tribe
subsequently sued in Bad River Tribal Court to have the employment contract declared
null and void as it had never been ratified by the Tribal Council or approved by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs. 34
Under P.L. 280, Wisconsin courts have concurrent civil adjudicatory jurisdiction
along with tribal courts.35 Wisconsin is unusual in that it is one of only six states,36
known as Public Law 280 states, in which the state has full criminal and partial civil
jurisdiction within Indian Country. 37 There was not much dispute in the Teague case that
both the tribal and state courts could exercise jurisdiction. The problem was that they
both did.
Teague filed first in state court seeking to compel the Tribe to participate in
arbitration. The Tribe resisted, but the trial court found the Tribe must participate. After
that ruling but before arbitration, the Tribe sought a declaratory ruling in Bad River
Tribal Court that Teague's contract with the Band was null and void because it had not
been approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs as required under tribal law.
The parallel litigation grinded forward for years. Mr. Teague acknowledged
personal service of the Band's complaint and participated in discovery, but he refused to
participate further in the tribal court proceedings. 38 Each court eventually reached
differing results. Based on the arbitration award, the Wisconsin trial court entered
judgment in favor of Mr. Teague for $390,199.42.39 The tribal court found the
employment contract void and entered judgment in favor of the Tribe. 4 0
The Tribe then moved for the state trial court to grant full faith and credit to the
tribal court judgment. 4 1 That motion was denied based on the prior action pending rule 42
on the grounds that the action had been filed in circuit court first. 43 The Tribe appealed,
and the court of appeals reversed, holding that the tribe properly had jurisdiction over the
dispute. 44
Mr. Teague appealed, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the prior action
pending rule did not apply as an Indian tribal court is the court of an independent
sovereign. 4 5 The court nevertheless reversed, ruling that when parallel state and tribal
court cases exist, state court judges must confer with their tribal court counterparts to
determine the proper allocation of jurisdiction in order to avoid races to the courthouse

33. Id.
34. Id. at 712.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2006); see also Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., Minn., 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (holding that
P.L. 280's extension of civil jurisdiction to the states did not include the power to tax).
36. § 1360(a) (Wisconsin (excluding Menominee), Oregon, California, Alaska, Nebraska, and Minnesota).

37. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2006); 25 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2006).
38. Teague, 612 N.W.2d at 713.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. The prior-action-pending rule is legalese for winning the "race to the courthouse." See Syver v. Hahn,
94 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Wis. 1959).
43. Teague, 612N.W.2d at 713.
44. Teague v. Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 599 N.W.2d 911 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1999).
45. Teague, 612N.W.2d at 717.
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and inconsistent results.
We are faced, then, with the unfortunate choice of ratifying either a
"race to the courthouse" or a "race to judgment," a situation the
legislature appears not to have contemplated in the enactment of Wis.
Stat. § 806.245. Either choice would produce undesirable and
unreasonable results, which we presume the legislature did not intend
to encourage by the adoption of the tribal full faith and credit statute.
On one hand, awarding exclusive jurisdiction to the winner of the race
to the courthouse (Teague) puts litigants rather than courts in charge of
a sensitive jurisdictional question and deprives the respective courts of
the opportunity to weigh considerations of comity. On the other hand,
granting full1 faith and credit to the winner of the race to judgment (the
Band) promotes competition between state and tribal courts, wastes
judicial resources, and creates an adversarial atmosphere.
This, ultimately, is not a question of full faith and credit under
the statute but of judicial allocation of jurisdiction pursuant to
principles of comity.
We conclude that comity in this situation required that the
circuit court and tribal court confer for purposes of allocating
jurisdiction between the two sovereigns. 4 6
The court specifically noted that precedent for requiring conferences for the
purpose of allocating jurisdiction already existed in the family law field in cases where
interstate jurisdictional conflict exists. 47
On remand, the circuit court judge and tribal judge held a conference on the record
with both parties. 48 The circuit court judge and tribal judge could not agree on how to
allocate jurisdication. 49 The circuit court again concluded that maintaining jurisdiction in
state court was appropriate, noting that the action had first been filed in state court, that
the law to be applied was predominantly Wisconsin law, and that the parties' contractual
choice of forum was state court. 50 The Tribe appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
which certified the appeal to the supreme court.
The supreme court affirmed its earlier take on the case: comity was the key issue,
not full faith and credit. Since the trial judges at the state and tribal courts could not
agree, the supreme court would have to take on the issue itself. The court created thirteen
factors to help state and tribal courts determine which court should proceed: 51
1. Where the action was first filed and the extent to which the case has

46. Id. at 717-19 (internal footnotes and citations omitted).
47. Id. at 719-20.
48. Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, No. 95-CV-130, 2001 WL
36120238 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2001).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 665 N.W.2d 899, 917-18 (Wis.
2003).
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proceeded in the first court.
2. The parties' and courts' expenditures of time and resources in each
court and the extent to which the parties have complied with any
applicable provisions of either court's scheduling orders.
3. The relative burdens on the parties, including cost, access to and
admissibility of evidence and matters of process, practice, and
procedure, including whether the action will be decided most
expeditiously in tribal or state court.
4. Whether the nature of the action implicates tribal sovereignty,
including but not limited to the following:
a. The subject matter of the litigation.
b. The identities and potential immunities of the parties.
5. Whether the issues in the case require application and interpretation
of a tribe's law or state law.
6. Whether the case involves traditional or cultural matters of the tribe.
7. Whether the location of material events giving rise to the litigation is
on tribal or state land.
8. The relative institutional or administrative interests of each court.
9. The tribal membership status of the parties.
10. The parties' choice by contract, if any, of a forum in the event of
dispute.
11. The parties' choice by contract, if any, of the law to be applied in
the event of a dispute.
12. Whether each court has jurisdiction over the dispute and the parties
and has determined its own jurisdiction.
13. Whether either jurisdiction has entered a final judgment that
conflicts with another judgment that is entitled to recognition.
Applying those factors, the court said it was a difficult decision, but that the factors
favored tribal court jurisdiction.52 The factors read like a codification of principles

52. Id. at 919.
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drawn from a variety of areas including comity, venue, jurisdiction and equity. The court
drew the factors from a several sources, 53 including an historic agreement between
Wisconsin's Tenth Judicial Administrative District and four Chippewa tribal courts in
the northwest part of the state. 54 The court then turned to the issue of whether the tribal
court judgment was entitled to full faith and credit under Wisconsin Statute section
806.245.55 The court concluded that the principles of comity required enforcement of the
tribal court judgment and remanded the case for dismissal of the complaint. 56
It is a credit to the state and tribal judges involved that the case strengthened, rather
than derailed, state-tribal judicial relations. Most judges did not skip a beat. If anything,
Teague presented an opportunity for everyone to roll up their sleeves and work on an
issue.
The case has slowly achieved landmark status in the state. Two federal court cases
have cited it favorably.57 The Wisconsin Supreme Court cited the case as a model for
interjurisdictional cooperation.58 In the wake of the case, Wisconsin Supreme Court
Chief Justice Abrahamson revived the State-Tribal Justice Forum.
There had been a few attempts at state and tribal judges working groups convening
since the 1980s, but each time, they had been relatively sporadic and short-lived. But
Chief Justice Abrahamson had a growing interest in Indian law and culture. She had
chaired the Committee on Jurisdiction in Indian Country of the Conference of Chief
Justices of State Supreme Courts and had been instrumentally supportive in developing
the national Common Ground symposia (the first two of which were held in Wisconsin,
hosted by the Oneida Nation and keynoted by the Chief Justice).
The State-Tribal Justice Forum is a joint committee of state and
tribal court representatives established by Chief Justice Abrahamson in
2005 to promote and sustain communication, education, and
cooperation among tribal and state court systems. The committee
consists of five circuit court judges, five tribal judges, one tribal
attorney, one legislative liaison, one district court administrator, and the
director of state courts. 59
53. Id. at 918 n.15.
54. Tribal/State Protocol For the Judicial Allocation of Jurisdiction Between the Four Chippewa Tribes of
Northern Wisconsin and the Tenth Judicial District of Wisconsin (Dec. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.tribal-institute.org/2004/handouts/Closing-Tribal%/ 20Perspective%/20-%/20David%/20RaaschState%20Tribal%.20C ourts%/2OWork%/20to%/20Build%/20-%/20Handouts.pdf
[hereinafter
Tribal/State
Protocol].
55. Teague, 665 N.W.2d at 919; Wis. STAT. § 806.245 (2012) ("(1) The judicial records, orders and
judgments of an Indian tribal court in Wisconsin and acts of an Indian tribal legislative body shall have the
same full faith and credit in the courts of this state as do the acts, records, orders and judgments of any other
governmental entity, if all of the following conditions are met: (a) The tribe which creates the tribal court and
tribal legislative body is organized under 25 USC 461 to 479. (b) The tribal documents are authenticated under
sub. (2). (c) The tribal court is a court of record. (d) The tribal court judgment offered in evidence is a valid
judgment. (e) The tribal court certifies that it grants full faith and credit to the judicial records, orders and
judgments of the courts of this state and to the acts of other governmental entities in this state.").
56. Teague, 665 N.W. 2d at 920.
57. Parry v. Haendiges, 458 F. Supp. 2d 90 (W.D.N.Y. 2006); Van Aemam v. Nenno, No. 06-CV0053C(F), 2006 WL 1644691 (W.D.N.Y. June 9, 2006); In re J.D.M.C., 739 N.W.2d 796 (S.D. 2007).
58. In re Jane E.P., 700 N.W.2d 863, 871 (Wis. 2005).
59. Wis. S. Ct. Order 07-11, In the matter of the petition to create a rule governing the discretionary transfer
of cases to tribal courts, 2008 WI 114, n.2 (issued July 31, 2008, eff Jan. 1, 2009).
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The Forum meets two to four times a year to confer and address
interjurisdictional and other issues.
Several factors are responsible for this incarnation of the Forum being sustainable
and successful. One of them stems from the commitment of the Chief Justice in
structuring the Forum to include active support from state court staff. Another was her
charge to the Forum in 2005 to make its work "beyond rhetoric," and to foster
cooperative and creative enthusiasm of the Forum members. And a final and important
element to the sustainable success of the Forum is the fact that it is the WTJA that
appoints the five tribal court judges. The existence of the WTJA creates a simple and
comprehensive way to involve tribal courts. It is in some ways comparable to the Office
of State Courts and provides a way to do things without the chaos of too many individual
judges. They are good examples of representative democracies.
Another of the many byproducts of the Teague litigation was the development of
tribal-state protocols in which state and tribal judges in various parts of the state agreed
on detailed written procedures on how parallel cases subject to the concurrent
jurisdiction of each court would be handled.
The development of the protocols was another incremental step in building
positive tribal-state relations. In the first Wisconsin Supreme Court Teague opinion, 60
the Court recognized that the dispute was not one of full faith and credit but rather one
"of judicial allocation of jurisdiction pursuant to principles of comity."61 The Court then
noted that there are no protocols for state and tribal courts to follow in this situation.62
The Court then wrote:
Similar problems exist between the courts of different states, and in this
context, states have in some areas of the law developed procedures to
follow in cases of jurisdictional conflict, where two sovereigns have
jurisdiction over the same matter. See, e.g., Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, Wis. Stat. ch. 822; Wis. Stat. § 767.025(1). The
development of similar protocols between state and tribal courts in
Wisconsin is a matter of high priority and should be pursued.63
The Court included a footnote about the March 1999 gathering of tribal, state and
federal judges where historical relations between tribes and states were discussed saying,
"[w]e believe that this is a logical forum for the development of protocols governing the
exercise of jurisdiction between the state and tribal courts." 64 The meeting mentioned by
the Court was one in a series commonly known as "Walking on Common Ground." 65
Wisconsin's Tenth Administrative District 66 took up the call. After extensive

60. Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 612 N.W.2d 709 (Wis. 2000).
61. Id. at 718 (describing the main difference between full faith and credit and comity is that the former is
mandatory while the latter is a matter of respect and discretion).
62. Id.
63. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 718 n.11.
65. Started in 1991 and met in 1999, 2005, 2009. Tribal/State Protocol, supra note 54.
66. For purposes of administering the court system statewide, Wisconsin is divided into ten geographic
districts. The Tenth District comprises thirteen counties in the northwest portion of the state. Each district has a
chief judge who is one of the circuit court judges sitting in that district. The map of the districts is available at
http://www.wicourts.gov/courts/circuit/map.htm (last visited August 19, 2011).
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negotiations and drafting, in 2001, the five Chippewa tribes in the northwest part of
Wisconsin signed the protocols with the Tenth Administrative District. There are four
tribes in the Tenth District: the Bad River Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, the Red
Cliff Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, the St. Croix Chippewa and Lac Courte Oreilles
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa. All four signed the protocol as well as the Chief Judge
of the Tenth Administrative District.
The protocol provides a detailed procedure which the state and tribal courts are to
use if a Teague-type situation arises, that is parallel litigation between the same parties in
both systems.67 If the judges cannot agree, a third judge is selected at random from a
pool of state and tribal judges. 68
The Ninth Administrative District followed suit in July 2005 with an agreement
between it and the five tribal courts therein: the Stockbridge-Munsee Community, the
Sokaogon Band of Lake Superior Chippewa, the Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa, the Forest County Potawatomi, and the Bad River Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa. 69
Teague's influence extends beyond Indian law. In In re Jane E.P.70 the court
confronted an interstate guardianship transfer that had nothing to do with Indian tribes or
Indians. In that case, the family of an incompetent forty-seven year old woman, Jane,
wanted to move her from a nursing home in Galena, Illinois to Grant County, Wisconsin,
where most of the family resided. The Grant County Department of Social Services
applied in the Wisconsin courts for a guardianship and a protective placement at a
nursing home in Grant County. Jane's sister served as her guardian. The court dismissed
because Wisconsin Statute section 55.06(3)(c) requires the proposed ward to be a
resident of the county where the filing took place. The court of appeals reversed finding
Wisconsin Statute section 55.06(3)(c) to be an unconstitutional impediment to interstate
travel. Citing to Teague, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
finding the issue to be one of comity.71
The court then used Teague as a blueprint for articulating and applying a list of
factors courts should use in deciding issues of comity in the context of interstate transfer
of guardianship cases72 saying, "[t]he hallmarks of these standards are communication
and notice." 73 The broader principles of the Teague case informed the way the court
viewed the guardianship issue: "Courts must work together in respect and cooperation to
further the dignity of the judicial system and to promote the orderly administration of
justice. Accordingly, as in Teague, we set forth standards for Wisconsin courts to follow
when confronted with interstate guardianships." 74
That the Wisconsin Supreme Court would borrow from an Indian law case and

67.
68.
69.
Byrns,
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Tribal/State Protocol, supranote 54.
Id.
Copies of the Ninth District Protocol may be obtained from the District Court Administrator, Susan
(715) 842-3872, 2100 Stewart Avenue, Suite 310, Wausau, WI 54401.
In re Jane E.P., 700 N.W.2d 863 (Wis. 2005).
Id. at 871, 876.
Id. at 871.
Id.
Id.
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apply it in a different context is a testament to the influence and sound reasoning of the
Teague decision and its principles. It is easy to think of many examples where a concept
or doctrine applied from another area of the law to an Indian law problem ends up in
disaster for tribes. 7 5 It is heartening to see a general principle (comity) applied positively
in a tribal context and then cited for further positive use later.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's commitment to respect and cooperation has been
a strong link in the chain of tribal-state advancement. That cooperation is of course a
two-way street and is made of the human elements of comity discussed earlier: mutual
respect, trust, pragmatism and fairness.
The Teague case has also enjoyed recognition and influence beyond Wisconsin. In
Van Aernam v. Nenno,76 Kenneth Van Aernam, a member of the Seneca Nation of
Indians in Western New York sued a New York state court judge seeking to enjoin him
from exercising jurisdiction over Van Aernam's wife's 7 7 attempt to maintain a divorce
action in New York state court. Van Aernam had already obtained a divorce judgment in
the Seneca Nation's Peacemaker Court prior to Mrs. Van Aernam filing in state court.78
In New York, state courts possess concurrent civil jurisdiction on Indian Reservations
similar to Public Law 280 states.79 Mr. Van Aernam was two days away from a
contempt hearing in state court when he filed the federal action.
The procedural issue was whether the federal court was going to enjoin the state
court judge from exercising jurisdiction over Mrs. Van Aernam. The federal court found
there was concurrent jurisdiction between the state and tribe.80 The Court articulated the
regular test for injunctive relief:
According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a
permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may
grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered
an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3)
that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. 81
The court quickly dispensed with factors one, two, and four and reasoned the issue
came down to the ultimate question of "whether the tribal court or the state court should
be allowed to proceed to judgment where both courts have recognized concurrent
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases presented to them."82 Courts of equity,

75. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that eleventh amendment sovereign
immunity invalidates Tribes' right to sue under IGRA, thereby greatly reducing their bargaining power for
gaming compacts); Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that states can deny unemployment
benefits to peyote users even though use was for religious purposes; state may but is not required to
accommodate drug use).
76. Van Aernam v. Nenno, No. 06-CV-0053C(F), 2006 WL 1644691 (W.D.N.Y. June 9, 2006).
77. Mrs. Van Aemam is a non-member. Id. at *1.
78. Id.
79. 25 U.S.C. § 233 (2006).
80. Van Aernam, 2006 WL 1644691, at *10.
81. Id. at *6.
82. Id.
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the court continued, have solved this question as a matter of comity.83 '[T]he best
example" is the Teague case.84 The federal court then applied the thirteen Teague factors
in order to determine the outcome based on the third factor of the injunctive relief test.
Most factors weighed in favor of the tribal court or were neutral.
When considering the implication of sovereignty, the court noted the intervention
by the Seneca Nation and its wish to preserve its authority over the actions of nonIndians on reservation lands. 85 The court then cited the lesser-used passages from
LaPlante,86 Montana,87 and Santa Clara Pueblo,88 as support for Indian tribal court

jurisdiction over non-Indians. One cannot help but wonder if the context of the case - a
federal judge deciding the judicial forum for a divorce - has the salutary effect of
causing the judge to see the case from a more neutral or tribe-friendly angle than when
tribal non-judicial resources or power are at stake.
The factors tipped in favor of the tribal court and the judge enjoined the state court
from any further proceedings. 89
Later the same year, domestic discontent apparently contagious, the same court
confronted similar but slightly different facts in Parryv. Haendiges.9 0 The court applied
Teague and ruled against enjoining the state court. The timing and circumstances were
such that the application of the Teague factors led the court to conclude the balancing of
equities favored state court jurisdiction.91
Both Van Aernam and Parry involved domestic relations, an area traditionally
viewed as within a tribe's jurisdiction,92 and distinguishable from the employment issues
in Teague.
PART 4 -

DISCRETIONARY TRANSFER RULE - REFINING TEAGUE FOR EVERYDAY USE.

a. History and Origin

The State-Tribal Justice Forum had been revived by Chief Justice Abrahamson and
in the wake of the Teague case, it became clear that it was the right idea at the right time.
Looking to move beyond rhetoric and get something done, the Forum looked at Teague
and the so-called Teague Protocols and saw the next step. At a meeting of the Forum,
while acknowledging the significance of the Teague process, the judges agreed it was too
formal and cumbersome to work on a routine basis. What the state and the tribal courts
needed was a way to determine the best venue without having parties pay filing fees in a
second court system and invoke a protracted, though useful when needed, process. In
other words, it should not be necessary to create a crisis of competing actions in order to

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
Van Aernam, 2006 WL 1644691, at *10.
Parry v. Haendiges, 458 F. Supp. 2d 90 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id. at 97.
Id. at 96-97.
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determine the best court to hear a particular case.
The Forum realized the more common occurrence involves two parties, often pro
se, who in some cases had not considered or may not even be aware their case could be
heard in tribal court. In other cases, state judges realized the case simply belonged in
tribal court but absent a parallel case in tribal court, state judges felt a bit hamstrung as to
how to handle it. Some simply changed venue.93 Other judges simply dismissed the state
court action with the expectation the matter would be re-filed in tribal court. Others did
neither as they were uncertain of their authority.
These uncertainties led the Forum to seek the creation of a state statute which
permits state judges to transfer a case to tribal court on the state court's own motion, or
the motion of the parties, without a parallel action pending in tribal court. The statute
was less formal, less expensive, less confrontational, and more common-sense based.
b. Petition 7-11
In July 2007, after several months in the making, the State-Tribal Justice Forum
filed a petition with the Wisconsin Supreme Court asking it to exercise its rule-making
power 94 to create a section of the state statutes that would give state courts the power to
make discretionary transfers of cases to tribal court. The original petition was short and
to the point: give state trial judges the power to transfer cases from state to tribal courts.
The Forum indicated it had unanimous support among its members and had submitted
the document for review with various stakeholders including the Wisconsin Tribal
Judges Association, the Committee of Chief Judges, the Wisconsin Joint Legislative
Council's Special Committee on State-Tribal Relations and the State Bar of Wisconsin
Indian Law Section. 95
The supreme court sought written comments and scheduled a public hearing for
January 8, 2008.96 The court received ten written comments, none in opposition. The
public hearing went in somewhat unexpected directions. Various concerns were raised
by the justices including the scope of tribal court jurisdiction as limited by federal law,
the right (or lack thereof) to jury trials and certain defenses in tribal court, the role of the
legislature, and the mechanics of the transfers. 97
After the hearing, the court sought further comment and shared three questions: 1)
under what circumstances is jurisdiction concurrent between tribal and state courts? 2) is
there a right under the United States or Wisconsin constitution to have a case heard in
state court rather than tribal court? 3) how does the proposed rule impact the application
of Wis. Stat. § 806.245 (full faith and credit)?
The comments came back and the court met again in administrative conference,

93. Wis. STAT. §801.52 (1983).
94. Wis. STAT. §751.12 (2011).
95. Petition at 7, In re discretionary transfer of civil cases to tribal court (Wisconsin Supreme Court 2007),
available at http://www.wicourts.gov/supreme/docs/071lpetition.pdf.
96. Wis. S. Ct. Order 07-11, In the matter of the petition to create a rule governing the discretionary transfer
of cases to tribal courts, 2008 WI 114 (issued July 31, 2008, eff. Jan. 1, 2009).
97. Audio of the public hearing and administrative conferences is available on the court's web site along
with
the
written
comments
and
court
decisions:
WISCONSIN
COURT
SYSTEM,
http://www.wicourts.gov/scrules/071 1.htm (last visited August 19, 2011).
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open to the public. The court reviewed the responses after which more drafting and
revisions occurred. In a major change from the original submission, the court added a
provision to the rule that if the case is transferred to tribal court, the state trial court will
issue a stay and retain jurisdiction for five years, and that the trial court, upon motion and
notice to the parties, can modify the stay in the interests ofjustice.98 After five years, the
case is automatically dismissed. 99 After several drafts, the final version was agreed upon
and effective January 1, 20 10.100
The essence of the statute is to permit a state judge to apply the Teague factors
without a need for a parallel action in tribal court. The issue can be raised by a party or
the court on its own motion and the transfer can only occur after notice and a hearing on
the record. 10 1 The transfer decision is appealable as of right. 102
Many questions remain. The standard for modifying the stay, in the interests of
justice, gives a trial court judge plenty of discretion. At worst, tribal judges fear litigants
will go running back to state court when a ruling on the merits goes against them. At
best, the language leaves the door open for state courts to undermine tribal court
jurisdiction. Without further modification of the statute, it is the "respect" aspect of
comity that will ultimately have to answer these concerns.
Furthermore, in order to address some justices' legal concerns about a case leaving
the state system, the Court added the following comment, which is not a part of the
statutory text:
The purpose of this rule is to enable circuit courts to transfer civil
actions to tribal courts in Wisconsin as efficiently as possible where
appropriate. In considering the factors under sub[section] (2), the
circuit court shall give particular weight to the constitutional rights of
the litigants and their rights to assert all available claims and
defenses. 103
These changes were viewed as compromises in order to secure four out of seven
votes of the justices necessary for majority. The comment is particularly nettlesome.
Although it lacks the force of law because it is positioned as a comment, it creates a fear
in state judges that they misapply the rule if they transfer to a tribal court that does not
allow all substantive state law claims and defenses. Given that tribal courts are the "third
sovereign,"104 the comment could be viewed as potentially poisoning the legislation by
removing its usefulness and vitality for fear of not giving constitutional rights enough
weight. It is the "trust" aspect of comity that may ultimately answer these concerns.105
98. WIS. STAT. § 801.54(3) (2010).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. § 801.54(2).
102. Id. § 801.54(4).
103. Id. § 801.54, cmt.
104. Sandra Day O'Connor, Remark, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA
L.J. 1 (1997).
105. Although a slightly different context, federal courts have used tribal court criminal convictions to
establish a defendant's habitual offender status where the conviction complied with the ICRA, 25 U.S.C. §
1302 (2006), but the defendant did not have a right to counsel. See United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993
(10th Cir. 2011). The Court noted several instances where foreign convictions were accepted for various uses
as long as the conviction comported with United States' notions of "fundamental fairness." Id at 1000.
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Of course, the reality of the day-to-day warp and woof in state trial courts, where
(often) pro se litigants are disputing how to share their parenting rights, is much
different. Lofty notions of constitutional rights rarely come into play. Litigants want
courts to act fairly and promptly. Troubling because it is subversive and vague, the
comment has likely served its purpose by soothing one or more justices' fears with the
recognition, gained by experience, that trial judges are not easily paralyzed with
indecision.
However, the compromise did not soothe some of the justices. Justice Roggensack,
joined by two other justices, issued a strong dissent. The dissent listed four concerns:
(1) Rule 801.54 is inadequate and misleading in regard to addressing
tribal court concurrent subject matter jurisdiction, which jurisdiction is
extremely limited in scope when nonmembers are parties to the action;
(2) Rule 801.54 impermissibly alters the substantive rights of tribal
members, as well as nonmembers, contrary to the provisions of
Wis[consin] Stat[ute] § 751.12(1) (2005-06), which limits the court's
rule-making power; (3) Rule 801.54 undermines federal and state
constitutional and statutory rights of litigants; and (4) a majority of the
court has pushed this rule-change through before the end of the 200708 term of the court, even though the court has been presented with no
information about the substantive rights and civil procedures that are
available in tribal courts. 106
The objections do not hold up well under more careful consideration. The first
concern is over the "extremely" limited jurisdiction of tribal courts over non-members.
Whether tribal court jurisdiction is limited in the extreme depends on context and
perspective. It may be limited when compared to state courts, which generally do not
have to concern themselves with whether litigants are Indian, non-Indians or nonmember Indians when determining their own subject matter jurisdiction.
In the area of civil jurisdiction over non-members, tribal courts' jurisdiction over
non-members is limited by the so-called two Montanal07 exceptions: 1) "consensual
relationships" and 2) those nonmember activities which directly affect the tribe's
"political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare." 108 The Montana
exceptions are informed by Santa Clara and other cases that describe tribal jurisdiction

Similarly, the Tenth Circuit and other courts have permitted the use at trial of statements made to foreign law
enforcement, even though Miranda warnings were not given, absent substantial participation by agents of the
United States. See United States v. Conway, 57 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 1995) (unpublished); United States v.
Mundt, 508 F.2d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Chavarria, 443 F.2d 904, 905 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Nagelberg, 434 F.2d 585, 587 n.1 (2d
Cir. 1970).
106. Wis. S. Ct. Order 07-11, In the matter of the petition to create a rule governing the discretionary transfer
of cases to tribal courts, 2008 WI 114, I (issued July 31, 2008, eff. Jan. 1, 2009) (Roggensack, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
107. United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). Though not necessarily viewed this way by Indian law
practitioners, the federal courts have widely accepted Montana as the test for jurisdiction over non-Indians.
"Montana v. United States ... is the patimarking case concerning tribal civil authority over nonmembers."
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997).
108. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66.
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as being strongest when the tribe's internal relations are affected. 109 While tribes and
practitioners of Indian law lament the steady erosion of tribal jurisdiction over
reservation activities without any doctrinal or constitutional basis, 110 the remaining areas
of jurisdiction still cover a large swath of cases over non-members.
The two largest circumstances on any reservation conferring significant
jurisdiction over non-members are employment and domestic relations. With the advent
of gaming, tribes employ a significant number of non-members.111 Employment is a
consensual relationship, which would confer tribal court jurisdiction over
nonmembers.112 The second circumstance is the number of non-members, who by
marriage or other family arrangements, live on reservations. State courts have deferred to
tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers in certain family situations. 113 To say tribal
court jurisdiction is limited lacks objectivity. On larger reservations, there could be
thousands of non-Indians over which, through employment or family arrangements,
tribal courts have a colorable claim of jurisdiction. In state courts nationwide in 2008,
family law cases made up approximately twelve percent of all non-traffic civil cases.114
The second objection by the dissent is that the creation of Wisconsin Statute
section 801.54 exceeds the court's rule making authority because it goes beyond
procedure and alters the substantive rights of litigants. In one way or another, procedure
always shapes the merits. 1 15 However, the dissent claims that the rule alters litigants'
substantive rights because tribal law is different from state law. 116 The dissent's claim is
undermined by similar Wisconsin statutes enacted by the court.
Wisconsin Statute section 801.63 permits state courts to defer jurisdiction to any
other court outside the state of Wisconsin, which on its face includes courts of other
countries. 1 17 Section 801.63 arguably goes further than Wisconsin Statute section 801.54

109. Tribes possess the inherent power "necessary to protect tribal self-government [and] to control internal
relations." Id. at 564. This includes the inherent power to "determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic
relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members." Id.
I 10. Phillip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law,, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431
(2005).
111.

See

Employment

Opportunities,

ONEIDA

TRIBE

INDIANS

WISCONSIN,

http://www.oneidanation.org/humanresources/employment.aspx (last visited April 8, 2012).
112. Indeed the Teague case involved an employment dispute between Jerry Teague, a non-Indian, and the
Tribe. Jurisdiction over Mr. Teague was not an issue in the litigation. Teague v. Bad River Band of Chippewa
Indians, 665 N.W.2d 899 (Wis. 2003).
113. See, e.g., Kelly v. Kelly, 759 N.W.2d 721 (N.D. 2009) (State court granted non-Indian husband a
divorce but lacked jurisdiction over the incidents of marriage); see also Byzewski v. Byzewski, 429 N.W.2d
394 (N.D. 1988).
114. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008
STATE
COURT
CASELOADS
38
(2010),
available
at
http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-

Pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx (last visited June 15, 2011).
115. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1965) ("Undoubtedly, most alterations of the rules of practice
and procedure may and often do affect the rights of litigants. Congress' prohibition of any alteration of
substantive rights of litigants was obviously not addressed to such incidental effects as necessarily attend the
adoption of the prescribed new rules of procedure upon the rights of litigants who, agreeably to rules of
practice and procedure, have been brought before a court authorized to determine their rights.") (citations
omitted).
116. Wis. S. Ct Order 07-11, In the matter of the petition to create a rule governing the discretionary transfer
of cases to tribal courts, 2008 WI 114,
1, 15-18 (issued July 31, 2008, eff Jan. 1, 2009) (Roggensack, J.,
dissenting).
117. WIS. STAT. § 801.63 (2010).
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by permitting state courts to subject litigants to courts outside the United States which
are completely outside control of the U.S. Congress or U.S. Supreme Court. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court enacted Wisconsin Statute section 801.63 in 1975. In the
ensuing years, no appellate decision examining the statute has considered whether the
Court exceeded its authority by creating section 801.63.118 The dissent's third critique is
that section 801.54 impermissibly undermines litigants' state and federal constitutional
and statutory rights. This objection is faulty but does raise important issues. It is true that
litigants' rights in tribal court in some cases will be somewhat different than in other
jurisdictions. As the dissent notes, the United States constitution is not binding on tribal
courts.119 Although the Indian Civil Rights Act 20 ("ICRA") imposes most of the
limitations of the Bill of Rights on tribes, federal court remedies are limited to habeas
relief, and not all of the Bill of Rights' guarantees are contained in the ICRA. Tribal
courts, for example, are not bound by the Establishment Clause, nor are they required to
provide counsel to an indigent criminal defendant. 12 1
Nevertheless, the dissent's protest is softened by four points: 1) tribal court judges
care about doing substantial justice between the parties even if the substantive laws in a
jurisdiction might be different. In a comprehensive study of the largest tribal court
system in the United States, the Navajo Nation Court System, there was no significant
difference in outcomes for members and non-members.122 2) Tribes and their courts are
subject to the plenary power of Congress, which over the decades has not shown any
shyness in legislating on tribal rights;123 3) to the chagrin of tribal practitioners, under
Wisconsin Statute section 801.54, the circuit court is not completely transferring the
case. Rather the circuit court retains jurisdiction for five years. During that time, it can
alter the stay or take any other action as the interests of justice require; 124 4) the scrutiny
on tribal courts by outsiders and their own communities serve as an important check on
the decisions of tribal judges.
Furthermore, at least with respect to Indians occasionally losing access to state
court, the Supreme Court has stated:
[E]ven if a jurisdictional holding occasionally results in denying an
Indian plaintiff a forum to which a non-Indian has access, such
disparate treatment of the Indian is justified because it is intended to
benefit the class of which he is a member by furthering the
congressional policy of Indian self-government.12 5
One could argue that the occasional denial of a non-Indian to state courts,
I18. See, e.g, Helgeland v. Wis. Municipalities, 745 N.W.2d I (Wis. 2008); Dep't of Admin. v. WERC, 280
N.W.2d 150 (Wis. 1979); State v. Cockrell, 741 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007).
119. Wis. S. Ct. Order 07-11, In the matter of the petition to create a rule governing the discretionary transfer
of cases to tribal courts, 2008 WI 114,
18 (issued July 31, 2008, eff. Jan. 1, 2009) (Roggensack, J.,
dissenting) (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-83 (1896)).
120. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006).
121. Id.
122. Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdictionover Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems,
37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047 (1995).
123. See, e.g., Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2006); Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2006); Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629h (2006).
124. Wis. STAT. § 801.54(3) (2010).
125. Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390-91 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-55 (1974)).
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assuming the Tribe has jurisdiction, is also justified in the interest of furthering Indian
self-government.
There is one more response that is less legal and more human. Tribal judges care
about doing justice to the parties just as much as their state counterparts. During the
public hearing, it was difficult for some tribal judges to listen to some of the questions
from the dissenters because the unspoken assumption seemed to be that if a case goes to
tribal court, there was a real risk that nonmembers would not receive a fair shake or
would be at a disadvantage against a member of the Tribe. 126
The dissenters' fourth complaint is factual rather than legal: the dissent objects to
the rule because it claims no information was presented about Wisconsin tribal courts'
civil procedures or substantive rights. This may be true, but it rings hollow because with
the Petition pending for almost a full year, those materials could have been easily
obtained. Many of the Tribes in Wisconsin make their laws and rules of civil procedure
available over the Internet.127 Within a few minutes from any computer at the Supreme
Court, the dissenters could have reviewed many tribes' laws.
Moreover, the dissent seems to imply a lack of faith in the state's own trial court
judges. Since the transfer is discretionary,is it not fairly safe to assume that a local state
court judge will have an informed opinion on the fairness and efficacy of the local tribal
court, and if the judge transfers a case to tribal court, it is because it seems prudent and
responsible?
c. Amendment for Family Law
Almost as soon as it was effective on January 1, 2009, the Wisconsin Department
of Families and Children ("DCF") requested an amendment to Wisconsin Statute section
801.54. The statute's requirement of having a hearing on the record was unwieldy where
transfer of hundreds, if not thousands, of post-judgment child support cases from state to
tribal court were being contemplated.128 DCF wrote to the Courtl29 and requested the
Court amend the statute to permit a state court to make transfers without a hearing on the
record after a negative notice to both parties. By negative notice, the DCF was proposing
that the county child support agency would send written notice to the parties of the
proposed transfer to tribal court. If neither objected, no hearing is held, and the case is
126. Although during one exchange with Judge White-Fish of the Forest County Potawatomi over jury trials,
Judge White-Fish humorously pointed out that, at least in Forest County Potawatomi Tribal Court, it is not
necessarily an advantage to have your family members on the jury, the implication being they may be harder on
their own tribal and family members. For audio of the Public Hearing, January 8, 2008, see WISCONSIN
COURT SYSTEM, http://www.wicourts.gov/scrules/0711.htm (last visited August 19, 2011).
127. See, e.g., Judiciary, Ho-CHUNK NATION, http://www.ho-chunknation.com/?Pageld=28 (last visited
June

13,

2011);

Oneida Tribal Judicial System,

SOVEREIGN

ONEIDA

NATION

OF

WISCONSIN,

http://www.oneidanation.org/government/page.aspx?id=4780 (last visited June 13, 2011); Tribal Ordinances,
STOCKBRIDGE-MUNSEE

COMMUNITY,

http://www.mohican-

nsn.gov/Departments/Legal/Ordinances/index.htm (last visited June 13, 2011).
128. In 1997, under the amendments to Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (2006),
federally recognized Indian tribes were made eligible to receive IV-D funding to establish their own child
support agencies. Up until the amendments, tribes could only receive IV-D funding if the state agreed to share
its IV-D funds. Tribes have started applying for and receiving these funds. The Lac du Flambeau, Menominee,
Forest County Potawatomi and Oneida Tribes all have successfully established tribal IV-D agencies.
129. Letter from Connie Chesnik, DCF Att'y, to Chief Justice Abrahamson (Feb. 9, 2009) (on file with
author).
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transferred to tribal court. The negative notice amendment only applies to the transfer of
post-judgment child support, custody or placement provisions.130
The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not hold a public hearing, but examined the
issue at its administrative conferences on March 9 and May 1, 2009.131 The Court
modified the amendment to require a threshold determination of concurrent
jurisdiction.132
The amendment drew criticism again from the dissenters from of the original
rule. 133 The dissenters essentially repeated their original claims, showing a fixation with
tribes' allegedly limited jurisdiction over non-members. 134 The dissent seemed to
discount state trial courts' ability to apply the law to the facts by claiming it "is not a
simple matter for a circuit court to determine" whether one of the two Montana
exceptions will apply.1 35 The dissent continues that the statute is "completely inadequate
in addressing this major obstacle to the exercise of tribal court jurisdiction." 1 3 6 As
discussed above, the family and employment contexts fit squarely into Montana's
exceptions and represent potentially large pools of non-member litigants over which
tribal courts have subject matter and personal jurisdiction. In fact, a Wisconsin appellate
court recently affirmed tribal court jurisdiction under Montana's first exception.1 37
It is noteworthy that again the dissenting Justices seemed to evince a curious
distrust of their own state trial court judges to determine if it makes sense to transfer a
case to tribal court. It is also worth noting that during the hearings on this rule, the
dissenting Justices, while very concerned about non-Indians getting fair treatment in
tribal court, did not seem nearly as concerned about Indians getting the same.
The last chapter up to the writing of this article occurred on July 1, 2011. The
original order effective January 1, 2009, called for a two year review. The court held a
public hearing on October 18, 2010, at which time some verbal and written comments
were offered. The justices reviewed all the comments, and a majority concluded the rule
was working properly without any major concerns. By a 4-3 vote, the court kept the rule
in place without further amendment and scheduled the next review in five years.138
d. Kroner v. Oneida Seven Generations1 3 9
On June 1, 2011, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals decided the first appellate case
reviewing application of Wisconsin Statute section 801.54. In Kroner, John Kroner was

13 0. Id.
131. Wis. S. Ct. Order 07-11 A, In the matter of the petition to create a rule governing the
transfer of cases to tribal courts, 2009 WI 63 (issued July 1, 2009, eff July 1, 2009).
132. WIS. STAT. § 801.54(2m) (2010).
133. Wis. S. Ct. Order 07-11 A, In the matter of the petition to create a rule governing the
transfer of cases to tribal courts, 2009 WI 63, 1-26 (issued July 1, 2009, eff July 1, 2009).
134. Id. 15-21 (Roggensack, J., dissenting).
135. Id. 21.
136. Id.
137. Kroner v. Oneida Seven Generations, No. 2010AP2533, 2011 WL 2135681 (Wis. Ct.
2011).
138. Wis. S. Ct. Order 07-11 B, In the matter of the petition to create a rule governing the
transfer of cases to tribal courts, 2011 WI 53 (issued July 1, 2011).
139. Kroner,2011 WL2135681.
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the Chief Executive Officer for Oneida Seven Generations Corporation, a tribally
chartered corporation of which the sole shareholder is the Oneida Tribe of Indians of
Wisconsin. 140 Kroner's employment was terminated in 2008, and he sued Oneida Seven
Generations Corporation in Brown County circuit court. Oneida Seven Generations filed
various motions to dismiss. At a hearing on the motions, two months after the effective
datel41 of Wisconsin Statute section 801.54, the circuit court reserved ruling on the
motions and suggested the parties should consider having the matter transferred to the
Oneida Tribal Judicial System.142 The parties conducted discovery and the case
languished a bit. Fourteen months later, Oneida Seven Generations filed a motion for
discretionary transfer under Wisconsin Statute section 801.54.143 The circuit court ruled
in favor of the transfer, and Kroner appealed.
In affirming, the appellate court confronted two issues: 1) did the state and tribal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the case and 2) did the state court properly apply
the factors listed in Wisconsin Statute section 801.54(2)(a)-(k)?
On the first issue, the court reasoned that Kroner's voluntary employment on tribal
lands, with a corporation, which is owned and controlled by the Tribe, met the first
Montana exception.144 That exception permits tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers "who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through
145
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements."
On the second issue, the Court reviewed the relevant factors, established in Teague
and then codified in Wisconsin Statute section 801.54, used to determine whether to
transfer a case. Nearly all weighed in favor of Oneida Seven Generations or were neutral.
The trial court relied heavily on the first factor, which states: "[w]hether issues in the
action require interpretation of the tribe's laws, including the tribe's constitution,
statutes, bylaws, ordinances, resolutions, or case law." 146 The trial court stated this was
the "critical issue," and that it believed the Oneida tribal court was "far better equipped"
47
to "interpret Oneida Nation rules, documents, legislation [and] tribal policies[.]'1
The court of appeals found the second factor, the presence of cultural issues, to be
of minimal importance, though Oneida Seven Generations argued Kroner's race weighed
in favor of tribal court jurisdiction because Kroner "asserted his termination may have
been related to his status as a non-member of the tribe." 14 8 Oneida Seven Generation's
argument turned the factor on its head and raised many more questions including: is the
state court or tribal court better situated to determine the issue of alleged racial bias
against a non-member?
On the one hand, nonmembers probably feel there is some "home court" bias
140. Id.at*1.
141. See Wis. S. Ct. Order 07-11, In the matter of the petition to create a rule governing the discretionary
transfer of cases to tribal courts, 2008 WI 114 (issued July 31, 2008, eff Jan. 1, 2009).
142. Kroner, 2011 WL 2135681, at*1.
143. Id.at *2.
144. Id.at *4.
145. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
146. Wis. STAT. § 801.54(2)(a) (2011) (repealed July 1, 2011).
147. Kroner, 2011 WL 2135681, at *6 (quoting from trial court transcript) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
148. Id.
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against them in tribal court. Tribal litigants likely feel the same way in state court. One
argument in favor of tribal court jurisdiction is that tribal judges are more likely to know
the norms and mores of how nonmembers are treated under tribal law. After all, tribes
are likely more familiar with the legal preferences in favor of tribal members under tribal
and federal law. 14 9 The suspicion of outsiders is that because tribes are small, their
kinship ties will override legal obligations to outsiders. There is no evidence that tribal
courts are more susceptible to this than state or federal courts. 150 It is the "fairness"
aspect of comity that may ultimately answer these concerns.
PART 5 -

WHY Is THIS WORKING?

When people are brought together by necessity they can make things happen. P.L.
280 created that necessity. The state and the tribes all, over time, acknowledged a
responsibility and no one wanted to walk away from it. That meant they had to make it
work. One tribal judge has noted that both state and tribal courts view things differently
when you substitute the word "responsibility" for "jurisdiction."
There are people on the tribal side who would like to see the state and its counties
gone from the reservations, so tribal justice could evolve in a more indigenous way.
There are people on the state side who would like to see the tribes stop struggling to
create their own justice systems and simply buy into the established state system. All
these people give impetus to those who are committed to making both systems
collaboratively better by staying on the high ground of mutual respect.
One statewide system of justice might be simpler, but it is not going to happen.
One collective tribal system for all the reservations might be simpler, but that is not
going to happen either. We are very fortunate in Wisconsin to have some courageous
state and tribal judicial leaders who do not cling to simplistic theoretical solutions, but
rather seem to enjoy the challenges of working through the maze of rights and
responsibilities.
There are some key structural elements that have gotten us this far. The first is that
Wisconsin is one of the few states with a full faith and credit statute between state and
tribal courts.151 A tribal court decision will receive full faith and credit if:
(1) the tribe is organized under the Indian Reorganization Act; (2) the
judgment is authenticated; (3) the tribal court is a court of record; (4)
the judgment is a valid judgment; and (5) the tribal court certifies that it
grants full faith and credit to the judgments of Wisconsin state courts
and to the acts of other Wisconsin government entities.152
Beyond its practical usefulness, the statute is an important signal from the
Wisconsin legislature: it affirms the important of reciprocity for both jurisdictions, and is
one more support for comity.
149. See, e.g., Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985)
(recognizing expertise of tribal courts in determining issues of jurisdiction).
150. See, e.g., George C. Sisk et al., Chartingthe Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of
JudicialReasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1377 (1998).
151. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 806.245 (West 2010).
152. Paul Stenzel, Full Faith and Credit and Cooperation Between State and Tribal Courts: Catching Up to
the Law, 2 J. CT. INNOVATION 225, 231-32 (2009).
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Another of the key elements is the WTJA. Having that single representative tribal
entity gave the state somewhere to go to engage the conversation and untangle some of
the ambiguities. Dealing with eleven different sovereigns, each with their own
constitutions, laws, customs, politics and local issues, is a formidable obstacle. The
WTJA provides a workable forum for discussion of mutual interests.
It is important to note that the WTJA's priority, in its creation and continued
existence, is to serve the needs of tribes and tribal courts. It is successful because of its
organic tribal essence. It did not arise to serve the interests of the state or even to be a
convenient communication vehicle for state-tribal relations, though it has been extremely
valuable in that role. The WTJA mission and function is driven by tribal judges and their
concerns, wants and needs. The fidelity to core tribal issues makes it sustainable and a
success when interfacing with the state judges.
One important aspect of comity as it applies to the discretionary transfer of cases is
that it takes two to transfer. When a state court (examining such issues as concurrent
jurisdiction, convenience and pragmatism) determines it is a good idea to transfer a case
to a tribal court - that is only half of the equation. It is then up to the tribal court
(examining such issues as concurrent jurisdiction, convenience and pragmatism) to
determine whether or not to accept the case.
The State-Tribal Judicial Forum is another key element. Here, credit goes to Chief
Justice Shirley Abrahamson for her foresight and her style. She nudged this current
incarnation of the Forum into a reconstituted existence by appointing a good mix of state
court judges and a few others with expertise and interest. She also took advantage of the
existence of the WTJA and asked them to appoint a number of tribal judges equal to the
number of state judges. From common sense comes common ground. Mutual respect is a
common element of both common sense and common ground.
The Forum's value also comes from the relationships that are formed. It is not
news that when an issue or problem arises, a person is going to be more likely to pick up
the phone and call someone the person already knows. The Forum helps comity because
by working together on issues of mutual concern, the state and tribal judges get to know
each other and build the trust, wisdom and courage to call on each other in a critical
moment. Those relationships allow the judges to find the middle ground of comity
between obligation and courtesy.
From these structures have come numerous cumulatively significant gatherings.
There have been five WTJA-sponsored continuing legal education seminars designed for
state court judges on themes such as P.L. 280 Jurisdiction and the Indian Child Welfare
Act. For these the State Supreme Court has granted state court judges continuing judicial
education credits to attend. There have also been two "roundtables" or "crackerbarrels"
designed to be less formal than the seminars, wherein state and tribal judges have an
opportunity to meet with their regional counterparts.
The Annual State Court Judicial Conference now routinely contains a session or
more on tribal/state judicial relations and tribal judges are routinely invited to attend and
participate. Also emerging out of these structures have been two national "Walking On
Common Ground" conferences held here in Wisconsin. These have been promoted by
Chief Justice Abrahamson and hosted by the Oneida Nation. They have featured topics
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of interest to tribal, state and federal courts, and have now become a "road show" by
convening elsewhere nationally and more recently have taken on a regional emphasis to
enhance their one-on-one practical value.
While these key structural elements have made much of what has happened
possible, it is the people involved who have made them successful. Indeed, it is the
people involved who made the structural elements come together in the first place.
What makes all this work locally, on the common ground, is the mutual respect
and collegiality of the players. The Teague decision came from a lack of collegiality and
mutual respect. The supreme court then, in its decision, insisted on it, even mapping out
how to get there. From that grew the Teague Protocols. State and tribal judges coming
together regionally to find common solutions . .. or at least procedures. From that
emerged the Discretionary Transfer Rule growing out of those kinds of local
circumstances that by their nature incline people to work together - if you have the
right people. Fortunately, we have found for the most part the right people here and they
have stepped forward. The result is perhaps not yet a well-paved interstate highway, but
it is a clearly marked road for those of us walking on common ground ... and it has
lanes running in both directions.
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